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COMMENTARY
Germany in the EU after Merkel:
A view from Italy
As Germany moves into a new political era after Merkel, Italy remains con�dent
about the country’s leadership role in the EU – as long as it is willing to engage
meaningfully with other member states besides France and can raise the bar on
foreign policy matters.
The German elections  were  expected to  be a  potentially  destabilising  factor  for  the
entire EU. This was due both to the certainty of the end of the Merkel era, after 16 years
of uninterrupted Chancellorship, and to the uncertainty around the outcome, given the
swinging  polls  in  the  months  preceding  the  elections.  However,  Germany’s  political
system has proved to be resilient. The ongoing negotiations for the formation of a new
government promise to leave Berlin in the driver’s seat of European integration. That’s
good news for Italy, as long as Germany engages with willing and able member states
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When  analysing  the  impact  of  the  vote  on  Berlin’s  role  in  the  EU,  one  needs  to
di�erentiate between two aspects: the end of Angela Merkel’s tenure and the prospects
for the next German government. Regarding the former, Chancellor Merkel has in many
ways been a unifying force for Europe. Many times she helped build a consensus in the
European Council  among the leaders of  Northern and Southern European countries,
founding members and countries that joined the Union after 2004. The most recent
example were the negotiations for the NextGenerationEU recovery package. She also
promoted agreement between EU member states towards common goals, such as with
the  launch of  Permanent  Structured Cooperation  (PESCO)  in  the  �eld  of  defence.  It
seems unlikely that the new Chancellor can play the same role, with the same level of
gravitas, and some are starting to look elsewhere – notably at Mario Draghi – to �nd a
possible heir.
At  the  same  time,  Angela  Merkel  has  been  hesitant  when  it  comes  to  important
decisions in economic governance and foreign policy, taking a wait-and-see attitude that,
on many occasions, condemned the EU to inaction. In the end, this was interpreted as a
lack  of  vision  for  the  future  of  Europe  and  a  preference  for  ensuring  incremental
progress rather than betting on a grand strategy. This approach is partly a consequence
of  her  cautious  political  character  –  and  therefore  it  might  change  with  the  next
Chancellor. However, it was also the result of structural factors that will remain in the
next  legislature.  The  new  Chancellor  will  continue  to  be  the  leader  of  a  coalition
government. Merkel’s successor will also be forced to �nd compromises among di�erent
parties while trying to accommodate the expectations of the powerful Länder. At the
same  time,  the  new  Chancellor  will  have  to  maintain  the  balance  between  the
commitments of EU membership and Germany’s constitutional constraints.  Two cases
in point are the potential re-introduction of the debt brake after its suspension in 2020,
which might clash with the new EU approach to debt rules aimed at supporting green
and growth capital investments, and the strict limitations on the use of military force,
which might hamper Germany’s contribution to a boosted EU defence.
The �rst obstacle that needs to be overcome is the formation of a coalition and the
agreement  on  a  common  programme  for  the  next  four  years.  Many  in  Italy  and
elsewhere worried that lengthy negotiations would paralyse the EU in a crucial phase,
when the priorities are to cope with the aftermath of the Afghan crisis and the recovery
from the COVID-19 pandemic, and in view of a possible stalemate in the French elections
next spring.
However, by now it seems that none of the parties involved in the coalition talks – the
SPD,  the  Greens  and  the  FDP–  has  an  interest  in  prolonging  this  process  beyond
Christmas,  even  if  it  would  imply  a  di�cult  compromise  on  issues  ranging  from  a
minimum wage to the pace of the energy transition, and the relationship with China. On
their side, the EU and national capitals need to get ready to face the institutional and
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political implications of a so-called tra�c light coalition led by former SPD leader Olaf
Scholz.
At  the  institutional  level,  the  most  powerful  European political  family,  the  European
People’s Party (EPP), would lose an important seat in the European Council. However,
the  European  Council  would  still  include  eight  national  leaders  a�liated  with  the
conservatives, compared to seven leaders a�liated with the Party of European Socialists
and six with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The EPP will also pro�t
from the fact that the next president of the European Parliament will come from its own
ranks, in strict observance of the alternating term of two and a half years between the
two major political  parties.  The Party of European Socialists would thus be excluded
from all top EU positions despite being the second biggest political force in Europe, with
the partial compensation of the post of High Representative being occupied by Josep
Borrell.
The end of the Merkel era will also a�ect Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
She stands to lose a close ally in the midst of her mandate, given her strong personal
and political bond with former Chancellor Merkel. This could lead to a consolidation of
the  link  between  the  Commission  and  France  for  the  implementation  of  the  EU’s
Strategic Agenda, thus expanding the room of manoeuvre of Paris and making it harder
for  member  states  like  Italy  to  exercise  a  more  meaningful  role  in  setting  the  EU’s
priorities.  
The coalition agreement and the allocation of cabinet posts will also have an impact on
European policies, and Italy. If FDP leader Christian Lindner becomes the next Finance
Minister, Germany’s position on the reform of the EU’s �scal rules will likely harden and
swing  in  favour  of  a  severe  �scal  adjustment  after  the  unprecedented  increase  of
national  public  debts  to  cope  with  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  This  goes  against  the
interests of Italy, but also of other countries like France and Spain. At the same time, the
SPD and the Greens might push for loosening de�cit and debt thresholds to invest in
social  and  green  priorities,  which  is  more  in  line  with  Italy’s  position.  Scholz’s
Chancellorship is reassuring for Italian stakeholders, especially due to his central role in
the negotiations that led to the adoption of NextGenerationEU, of which Italy is the �rst
bene�ciary. From his side, Scholz sees in Mario Draghi a guarantor for a collaborative
pro-European government in Rome and a strong leader for the implementation of the
national plan for recovery and resilience and the related reforms.
FDP and Greens have also insisted on the need to conduct a more value-based foreign
policy.  Many are expecting the new government  to  adopt  a  more assertive  position
towards China and Russia on the promotion of respect for human rights.
Italy, on its part, is solidly anchored to the transatlantic bond; a less permissive position
by Germany would be welcome insofar it  helps Europe to reinforce the transatlantic
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alliance, which has been negatively impacted both by the initiative to negotiate an EU-
China Investment Deal under the German Presidency of the EU Council and the Nord
Stream 2 project. At the same time, Italy would not be in favour of a head-on collision
with China and Russia, nor of an uncompromising position on international free trade,
as the �ght of the Greens against, for example, the EU-MERCOSUR agreement seems to
suggest.
All parties of the tra�c light coalition are in favour of a defence union and a European
army, but their position on the level of Germany’s commitment to defence spending and
participation  in  military  operations  is  not  clear.  Italy  would  bene�t  from  a  stronger
stance of Germany on defence matters. It would serve as a counterweight for French
leadership and even as a trigger to establish a core group of member states willing and
able to take further steps in the development of European defence capabilities.
All  German political  forces have con�rmed their  �rm pro-European stance and their
commitment to reinforcing EU institutions, with the only notable exception being the
extreme-right AfD.  Therefore,  seen from Rome, the current situation does not entail
major risks for the EU through the weakening of German domestic politics.  Berlin is
expected  to  remain  a  key  element  of  the  Franco-German  engine  in  favour  of  EU
integration. We have experienced the downsides of Germany being dominant during the
2008-2011  economic  and  �nancial  crisis  and  subsequent  euro  crisis;  and  those  of
Germany being reluctant in foreign policy matters. The best scenario for the next four
years  would  be  a  renewed  Germany  that  acts  as  a  driving  force  for  the  EU,  both
internally,  by  promoting  the  integration  process  in  an  inclusive  way  and  externally,
making Europe a more e�ective actor on the global stage.
Nicoletta Pirozzi, Head of European Union Programme and Institutional Relations
Manager at Istituto A�ari Internazionali (IAI)
The European Policy Centre continues to contribute to the analysis  of  Germany’s  EU
policy  (https://www.epc.eu/en/Projects/After-Merkel-A-power-vacuum-in-Europe-or-
a-fresh-start~40ef0c)  at  this  pivotal  moment  in  German  politics,  with  a  series  of
Commentaries running from July to December 2021. It will feature views from various
European capitals on post-Merkel expectations.
The  support  the  European  Policy  Centre  receives  for  its  ongoing  operations,  or
speci�cally for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents,
which re�ect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held
responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
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